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ABSTRACT
As network bandwidth increases, distributed applications are becoming increasingly
prevalent.
dependable.

Systems using these applications are very complicated to build and must be
Software agents are ideal for breaking complicated problems into manageable

subtasks. Agent conversations, a series of messages passed between agents, are the cornerstone
of multi-agent systems and must be deemed correct before being placed into service.

The

purpose of this research was to develop a formal methodology and technique to verify that the
communication protocols defined in a multi-agent environment were valid. This was
accomplished by examining agent conversations before deploying the system. An additional goal
of this research was to develop a proof-of-concept module for agentTool that automatically
verified some of the important properties identified in this methodology.
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A FORMAL METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE
FOR VERIFYING CONVERSATIONS
IN A CLOSED MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM
/. Introduction
As network bandwidth increases, the Air Force is fielding increasingly distributed C3I
applications.

This is clearly delineated by visionary documents such as Joint Vision 2010

(Shalikashvili, 1999), and Air Force 2025 (Kelley, 1996). The common thread in each of these
documents is information superiority, which the Air Force believes will be the key factor to
success in the 21st century. Distributed systems such as those required by the Air Force are very
complicated to build, but must be dependable if the warfighters whose lives are at risk are going
to trust them. Therefore, software engineers must ensure that the system and its information
sources are robust, reliable, and secure.

The Air Force's Office of Scientific Research is

sponsoring research in intelligent software agents because they believe software agents are the
appropriate mechanism for delivering these capabilities to the user. Distributed agents are well
suited to applications that retrieve, filter, and summarize information as well as provide
intelligent user interfaces and planning. The size and complexity of such a worldwide-distributed
system will necessitate formal and rigorous approaches to ensuring the entire system will be
interoperable and secure.
Before a multi-agent system can be trusted to perform as expected, the communication
methods between the agents must be formally verified.

The verification process includes

checking for infinite loops, deadlocks, and other communication pitfalls that would prevent a
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multi-agent system from completing its mission.

This thesis designs and implements a

methodology using formal methods that verifies that a system of agents will communicate as
expected before a user deploys the system. Then, and only then, the user of the multi-agent
system can be assured the system will communicate as expected.
1.1 Background
Many agent-based systems consist mainly of single agents. These agents do not have the
capability to cooperate with other agents and jointly solve a problem. However, advances in
technology and programming languages have enabled software engineers to create systems of
multiple agents that "team up" to solve tough problems. It is apparent that agents in multi-agent
systems have to communicate in a distributed environment and pool resources to solve problems.
The best way for software developers to tackle complex, large, or unpredictable domains
is by breaking the problem into smaller, manageable tasks. Software agents can be used to solve
these small tasks while working together to solve larger problems. Katia Sycara has observed
that often agents must operate concurrently in a distributed environment to accomplish difficult
tasks (Sycara, 1998).
1.2 agentTool
Agents communicate with each other using patterns of messages called conversations.
Conversations may be structured and predictable, or they may be unstructured and dynamic.
Structured conversations can be modeled using state transition diagrams.

Given a set of

conversation state transition diagrams, communication between agents can be simulated and all
possible message combinations exercised. Using this approach, conversations are deemed valid if
the desired message sequence takes place between the communicating agents. This process of
deeming the conversations valid or invalid is called verifying the agent conversations.
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Conversations can be verified manually (by a human analyst) or automatically (by intelligent
software and automated tools).
The software development environment, agentTool, is being created at the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) to address the need for a user friendly, robust tool for building
multi-agent systems. The tool is designed to be an integrated environment that allows a user to
graphically engineer a multi-agent system, verify the agent conversations with an automated
verification tool, and automatically generate the source code for the designed system. This allows
a user to specify a multi-agent system at three levels: domain, agent, and component. The
domain level is where agent classes and interactions are defined. The agent level is where the
internal agent architecture is defined.

Lastly, the component level is where individual

components in the system architecture are defined.

During the domain level design, the

communications between agents are specified as conversations. The system uses an automated
verification tool and formal modeling languages to verify these conversations are valid.
Feedback is provided to the user indicating whether the conversation design is valid.

The

automatic verification of agent conversations and message sequences using formal methods is the
focus of this research effort.
The agentTool system incorporates the latest technology in multi-agent systems.

A

designer uses pre-defined or user-defined components while building an agent system and
implements the system on various frameworks (Robinson, 2000). Users build agent systems with
graphical analysis and design tools that are easy and intuitive to use (Wood, 2000). A knowledge
base preserves agent designs and components providing agentTool with reusability, robustness,
and extensibility (Rafael, 2000).
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1.3 Problem Statement
Infinite loops, deadlocks, and other communication pitfalls can wreak havoc in a multiagent system. Even worse, the system can appear to be working while an undetected catastrophic
problem exists. The challenge is to explore paths that the conversation can feasibly encounter
and formally verify the conversation is valid. Once the conversations have been verified, the user
can trust the agents to communicate as expected.
Researchers at AFTT are currently developing agentTool.

To ensure security and

interoperability, agentTool must be able to enforce protocol policy on a proposed system.
Therefore, the goal of this research is to develop a formal methodology and technique to verify
that the communication protocols defined in a multi-agent environment are valid.

This is

accomplished by examining agent conversations before deploying the system. An additional goal
of this research is to develop a proof-of-concept module for agentTool that automatically verifies
some of the important properties identified in this methodology.
1.4 Assumptions
The following are assumptions concerning agentTool, designed agents, and their
operating environment.
1) Agents designed in agentTool will be used in a closed environment.

A closed

environment is one in which all participants are known and all conversations are
predetermined. An agent's behavior is predictable and agents communicate with
each other via conversations.
2) Agents can assume more than one role at a time, and can be involved in multiple
conversations at any given time.
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3) Conversations can be started from within other conversations.
4) System variables can impact conversations in adverse ways. It is possible for an
external factor to prevent a conversation from completing, even though the
conversation is perfectly valid and has been verified.

Therefore, it is assumed

agentTool will not be able to detect errors caused by system variables while verifying
conversations.
1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature and research including formal
languages, automated verification tools, and the types of agent conversation properties that can be
verified. Chapter 3 specifies a methodology that takes a conversation specification and verifies it
using an automated tool. Chapter 4 describes the application of the verification methodology and
the prototype to agentTool. Finally, Chapter 5 presents conclusions and future work.
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//. Background
2.1 Overview
This chapter reviews verifiable properties of agent conversations, and some of the
languages and tools available for verifying properties of agent conversations.

Section 2.2

explains how agents use conversations and how to model them. Why formal methods are needed
to verify conversations is covered in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes properties of agents that
are verifiable while providing simple examples of such properties. Finally, Section 2.5 presents
three formal languages and corresponding automated verification tools for verifying agent
conversations.
2.2 Multi-agent Systems and Agent Conversations
Agents in a multi-agent environment should communicate with each other with structured
messages. This enables the users of the multi-agent system to have assurance agents will perform
as designed without unpredictably performing some unassigned task autonomously.

The

structured sequence of messages is called an agent conversation. Granted, there are occasions
when agents are used in open environments where they may encounter any type of agent. In an
open environment, an agent must be able to dynamically construct its conversations. However,
this research is concerned with closed environments where agents are aware of their surroundings
and know who their fellow agents are. Perhaps most importantly, each agent knows how it is
supposed to communicate with its fellow agents.

Whenever an agent sends or receives a

message, it passes through various states of a conversation. These states determine how the agent
behaves.
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An agent conversation consists of an initiator side and a responder side. Both sides of
the conversation move through various states in harmony as the conversation develops.
Eventually, both sides of the conversation will end up in its respective end state and the
conversation will be completed. It is the state transition diagram that allows one to visualize the
various states a conversation goes through and records the events that cause the conversation to
move from state to state.
Figure 1 illustrates one side of a conversation and Figure 2 illustrates the complimentary
side of the conversation. The two sides make up one complete conversation.
failure-transmission''send(information)
Sendlnfo: initiator

)

•-■"■

^end(information)

wait

\
/

acknowledge

Figure 1: Initiator Half of Conversation Sendlnfo (DeLoach, 1999)
Sendlnfo: responder

wail

sendf informat w)
,,
send( information)

|

[invaliddata]"failuretransmission

validation
do: validate(information)

[valiiMataNcknowfedge
a^

Figure 2: Responder Half of Conversation Sendlnfo (DeLoach, 1999)
The beginning state in a conversation is the "start" state. It is signified by a solid circle.
The final state in a conversation is the "end" state and is signified by a solid circle with a ring
drawn around it. Each intermediary state is drawn as an unfilled rounded edge rectangle. The
state's name is inside the rectangle. Arrows between states indicate transitions between those
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states and the direction of the transition. Labels on the arrows indicate the events and actions that
take place to cause a transition from one state to another. The transition labels follow Unified
Modeling Language (UML) notation. The labels are formatted as follows:
event-name(argument list)[guard condition]/action-expression^sendclause
The label may contain some or all of this information. Each state may have more than
one entry point and exit point, but all exit points must be deterministic. Referring to Figure 4,
there are three states in the initiator side of the Sendlnfo conversation. They are the start, wait
and end states.

The transition from the start state to the wait state sends a

send (information) message. The information is a parameter that is passed with the
message.

The transition from the wait state back to the wait state takes place when a

failure-transmission message is received while in the wait state. This transition receives
a failure-transmission message then sends a send (information) message before
transitioning back to the wait state. Finally, the transition from the wait state to the end state
takes place when an acknowledge message is received while in the wait state. No messages
are sent during this transition and this side of the conversation ends.
2.3 Verifying Agent Conversations Using Formal Methods
Multi-agent software systems are difficult to build. Part of the research community
believes multi-agent systems should be open ended and conversations between various agents
should be dynamic and flexible (Sycara, 1998). Another part of the community believes agent
conversations should be predetermined and structured so that all possible variants of a
conversation are reproducible and verifiable (Harel, 1987). Some researchers have undertaken an
effort to develop formal approaches to assist the software developer in the analysis and design of
multi-agent systems (Holzmann, 1987). Fortunately, automated tool support is also available to

AFIT/GCS/ENG/OOM-12

assist with formal methods. Many tools have been developed that analyze concurrent systems.
These tools can also be used to verify agent conversations.
One of the simplest ways to verify agent conversations is with a technique called
reachability analysis (Cleaveland, 1993). Automated tools are excellent for this technique. The
first step in using an automated tool is to model the conversation using a language accepted by
the tool. Some of the most popular languages to choose from are Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) (Hoare, 1985), Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) (Milner, 1989), and
Process Meta Language (Promela) (Holzmann, 1997). After modeling the proposed system using
the required input language, the user may provide logical formulae describing undesirable states
that the system should never reach. Given such formulae and the system description, the tool
explores every possible state the conversation may reach during execution and checks to see if an
undesirable state is reachable. If so, the automated tool reports a description of the execution
sequence leading to the offending state. Using this approach, automated tools can find many
undesirable conditions such as deadlock and critical section violations.
Reachability analysis falls under a more general type of verification called model
checking (Cleaveland, 1993). Using this approach, an analyst describes a conversation using a
design language, and then specifies properties the conversation should have as logical formulae.
These formulae define behaviors the conversation should, or should not have as it executes and
contains temporal operators enabling one to describe how a conversation behaves as time passes.
Using such a temporal logic one can state properties such as the following:
•

The variable p will eventually become true

•

It is mandated that after p becomes true, q will become true and remain true
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In the next section, an overview of communication system properties and the various
methods of describing system properties are provided.
2.4 Properties of Communication Systems
Properties of communication systems in general fall under two broad categories: generic
and user-specified properties.

Generic properties that are applicable to all communication

systems are deadlock, infinite overtaking, and livelock.

User-specified properties of

communication systems can be further broken down into safety and liveness properties.
2.4.1 Generic Properties of Communication Systems
2.4.1.1 Deadlock
A deadlock is a situation in which two computer programs sharing the same resource
effectively prevent each other from accessing the resource, resulting in both programs blocked.
When computer operating systems run only one program at a time all of the resources of the
system are available to this one program. However, when operating systems run multiple
programs at once, interleaving them with each other, programs can request resources
dynamically. This can lead to the problem of deadlock. Here is a very simple example:
Program one requests resource A
Program two requests resource B
Program one requests resource
release it.
Program two requests resource
release it.

and receives it.
and receives it.
B and waits for program two to
A and waits

for program one to

Now neither program can proceed until the other program releases a resource. The
operating system has a dilemma and cannot know what action to take. At this point, the only
alternative is to kill one of the programs. Learning how to handle deadlock situations has had a
major impact on the development of not only operating systems but also communicating systems
in general.

10
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In agent conversations, deadlock can occur when both sides of a conversation wait to
receive a message that never arrives. This dilemma can happen many ways. The message could
be lost, an incorrect message could be sent, or the message could not be sent at all.
2.4.1.2 Infinite Overtaking
To demonstrate the concept of infinite overtaking, recall the infamous dining
philosophers' example as portrayed by C.A.R. Hoare in his book, Communicating Sequential
Processes (Hoare, 1985). A round table has been prepared with five chairs containing five
philosophers and a bowl of pasta in the middle of the table. Each of the philosophers has a fork
on the table between him and the other philosophers; thus, there are five forks in all. Before a
philosopher can eat, he must have a fork in each hand. This means that not all five philosophers
can eat at one time. Suppose a seated philosopher has a greedy left neighbor and a rather slow
left arm. Before he can pick up his left fork, his left neighbor rushes in, sits down, quickly picks
up his left and right forks, and has his fill of pasta. Eventually he puts down both forks and gets
up to leave. Then the left neighbor gets hungry again, sits down, and quickly grabs both of his
forks before his right neighbor has an opportunity to pick up the fork they share. Since the
philosopher with the bottomless stomach can repeat this cycle forever, the seated philosopher to
his right may starve to death.
One such agent-based scenario is where an agent requests information from a pool of
information brokers. If one of the brokers happens to be extremely quick, the remaining brokers
will never be able to answer any requests for information. The real loser in this scenario may be
the requester, for he may only get information from one source.

11
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2.4.1.3 Livelock
Livelock is a situation in which some critical stage of a task is unable to finish its
processing.

This is because the users of this particular task continuously create more work for

the task to do after the critical stage of the task has provided the requested service for them but
before the given task can clear its request queue. Livelock differs from deadlock in that the
process is not blocked or waiting for anything but has a virtually infinite amount of work to do
and can never catch up. An example of livelock is that of an interrupt driven operating system. If
too many interrupts arrive at the operating system's kernel and then continue to bombard the
kernel, the operating system will not be able to actually service any of the interrupt requests
because it will spend all of its time processing the receiving of the interrupts. In other words, the
operating system is so busy receiving interrupt requests it cannot service any of the requests.
Agent conversations can also succumb to livelock. A broker agent could be inundated
with requests for information to the point where he could never respond to all the requests
because his time is spent processing the receipt of requests.
2.4.2 User-defined Properties of Communication Systems
It is easy to take a snapshot of a system and analyze its properties. However, often it is
more desirable to know if eventually something will happen or conversely, that something will
never happen. This type of system property can be described using temporal operators. Many
properties of agent conversations can be expressed with temporal operators. For example, we
might want to know that if message A is sent to a recipient, eventually a reply will be received.
This property can be stated as "it is always the case that eventually we receive a reply from the
recipient." This is commonly known as message sequence verification.
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Temporal logic is simply an extension of propositional logic. The difference between the
two is that temporal logic has special operators that allow for time. Amir Pnueli defines a
temporal operator called the henceforth operator [ ] (Manna, 1992). An example of how this
operator would be used is [ ] p, read henceforth p or always p. Therefore, [ ] p holds at position q
if and only if p holds at position q and all of the following positions from now until
eternity.
Pnueli also defines a temporal operator called the eventually operator <>. An example of
this operator is <>p, read as eventually p. Therefore, <>p holds at position j if and only if
p becomes true at some position q where q>=j.
The combination of temporal operators can be used to form many types of user-defined
properties. The next few sections accent the types of conversation properties that can be
expressed with temporal operators.
2.4.2.1 Safety Properties
Safety properties have the form "bad things will not happen." These properties are
expressed by logical statements that the system state must satisfy at all times as well as pre and
post conditions. Preconditions reflect the state of a program before the execution of a set of
statements. Postconditions reflect the state of a program after the termination of a set of
statements.
2.4.2.1.1 Nontermination
As an example of a user-defined safety property, consider the property of nontermination
of a conversation. A conversation is nonterminating if it never enters an end state. This property
can be expressed by the formula [ ] (-iterminal).
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2.4.2.1.2 Conditional Safety
An example of a conditional safety formula is p-> [ ] q. In this case, whenever the state
formula p becomes true, the state formula q must be true forevermore. Applied to an agent
conversation, if a sender of a message receives a reply acknowledging receipt of said message,
the sender's conversation will terminate and stay terminated.
2.4.2.2 Liveness Properties
Liveness properties have the form "good things will happen." Examples of liveness
properties include termination or non-termination requirements in programs.
2.4.2.2.1 Guarantee Properties
Guarantee formulas state that some property will eventually happen. They guarantee that
the event happens at least once, but make no promises of the event repeating. In fact, it doesn't
matter if the event happens again, as long as it happens once. Therefore, guarantee formulas are
used to ensure events happen at least once in the lifetime of a program execution, such as
program termination.
An example of this property applied to an agent conversation is <> end. This means that
a conversation eventually enters the end state and terminates. This concept is also used to check
for the existence of livelock. If a process or conversation does not end when it is designed to end,
it is evidently caught in a livelock situation.
2.4.2.3 Obligation Properties
Sometimes a safety or liveness property alone does not sufficiently describe the desired
state of the system or conversation. In this case, a combination of the two types of properties is

14

AFIT/GCS/ENG/OOM-12

needed. An obligation formula is a formula of the form [] p || <>q. As expected, this formula
states that either p holds at all positions of a computation or q holds at some position.
2.4.2.3.1 Response Properties
An example of a response property is [ ] <>p. This property states that p can be satisfied
infinitely many times in the computation, but at least once. Applied to an agent conversation, a
response property would be used in the following scenario. A sender sends a message to a
receiver and waits a specified amount of time for an acknowledgment. If the acknowledgment
doesn't come, the message is sent again until an acknowledgment finally arrives.
2.4.2.3.2 Persistence Properties
Persistence properties are specified as <> [ ] p. This property states that all positions from
a certain point on in a computation or conversation will satisfy p. Persistence formulas are used
to describe the eventual stabilization of some state or property of the system or conversation.
These properties allow an unspecified and varying delay until the stabilization occurs, but
mandate that after occurring, it must be continuously maintained.
2.4.2.3.3 Reactivity Properties
Reactivity formulas are formed by a disjunction of a response formula and a persistence
formula [ ] <>p | | <> [ ] q. This formula states that either p occurs infinitely many times or q
occurs all but a finite number of times.
2.4.3 Summary
Many properties of systems can be verified with an automated verification tool, including
temporal properties. A system designer must first model the proposed system and then he can
simply define a system's behavior over time using temporal formulas. Automated tools can then
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search the entire state space of the system to verify that general communication faults are not
present and the described temporal properties hold true.
2.5 Formal Languages and Automated Verification Tools
This section provides an overview of three formal languages and three automated tools
that are used to model and verify communication systems. They are Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP), Failures-Divergence Refinement 2 (FDR2), Calculus of Communicating
Systems (CCS), Concurrency WorkBench (CWB), Process Meta Language (Promela) and Spin.
Together, these languages and tools help an analyst verify that a system design will perform
correctly.
2.5.1 Communicating Sequential Processes
C.A.R. Hoare first described CSP in a 1978 paper. The basic ideas from his original
paper were later adjusted and updated to produce a more flexible version of CSP (Hoare, 1985).
As an example of CSP syntax, consider a clock that never does anything but tick. The keyword
CLOCK describes the process and the keyword tick describes an event within the process (Hoare,
1985).
CLOCK = (tick->CLOCK)

This simple example illustrates a CSP recursive model. CSP allows the description of
systems as a group of individual processes, which communicate with each other over channels.
(Hoare eventually determined that component processes did not have to be sequential, but the
name was already established.)
The modularization of CSP fits the structure of many problems very well. With CSP, an
analyst models a system as a network of processes that communicate via messages along
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unidirectional channels. The transfer of messages between processes is synchronous, which
means the sending or receiving process stalls until the system transfers the message.
2.5.2 Failures-Divergence Refinement 2
FDR2 is a tool that allows an analyst to define a finite-state based system and then verify
the system is correctly designed (Lowe, 1997). It is based on the theory of Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP). The theory of refinement in CSP enables a system engineer to
describe a wide range of correctness conditions, including freedom from deadlock and livelock as
well as safety and liveness properties.
Early versions of FDR could analyze systems with 107 states in a modest amount of time
on standard workstations.

The most current version of FDR2 incorporates hierarchical

abstraction and compression routines that allow systems with very large state-spaces, (72*1024) for
example, to be analyzed in minutes.
FDR2 is simple to use and has extensive debugging facilities to support system
development. If an error is detected during a verification process, FDR2 provides a description of
the system state at the point where FDR2 detected the error, as well as the sequence of events that
lead to the error.
2.5.3 Calculus of Communicating Systems
Robin Milner's work on CCS developed from an experiment in 1972. While working in
the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at Stanford, he tried to apply ideas learned while working
on sequential programming to a concurrent programming language. However, he found this was
not possible (Milner, 1989).

One of the problems he ran into was because of an incorrect

assumption. One way to decipher a sequential program is as a mathematical function over system
memory states. If one knows the function corresponding to a particular program and the start
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state, then one can figure out the end state. The only problem with this approach is that it
assumes the program has exclusive control of the memory. If something interferes with the
memory, then unpredictable states result.
Two programs that have the same function can behave very differently when subjected to
the same interference. Milner gives a simple example where two lines of a computer program
have exactly the same effect, in the absence of interference:
1) x:=l

2)x:=0; x:=x+l

However, suppose some other process at some unpredictable moment performs x:=l.
Then the total effect of fragment 1 plus the other processes execution is different from that of
fragment 2 plus the offending process. In fragment 2, the value of x could be either 1 or 2,
depending on the given situation. This simple example demonstrates that in the presence of
concurrency or interference, programs do not have exclusive rights to memory, but instead
programs interact with each other while sharing memory.
This experiment prompted Milner to find an alternate theory in which communication
was the focus. In 1977 Milner learned of Hoare's work with CSP and realized that he and Hoare
both recognized that a new concept was needed, the concept of indivisible interaction. Milner
also started a concept called observation equivalence of processes. The theory of observation
equivalence was recorded in "A Calculus of Communicating Systems", published in 1980
(Milner, 1989).
An example of CCS follows.
C
=
C(x) =

infx).C'(x)
out(x).C

Milner points out that agent names like C or C can take parameters (Milner, 1989). In this case
c takes one parameter but C takes none. The prefix "in(x) ." means a handshake takes place
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where a value is received at port in and the variable x becomes equal to that value.
in(x) .c (x) is an agent expression. It is required to perform the aforementioned handshake
and then continue according to the definition of c'. The statement, out (x) . c, is also an agent
expression. This agent's behavior is to place the value of x at port out and then continue
according to the definition of c.
2.5.4 The Concurrency WorkBench
The Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench is an automated tool designed to manipulate and
analyze concurrent systems (Stevens, 1998). The CWB enables its users to check their systems in
many different ways. The definition language for CWB is CCS. With CWB, users can perform
tests on specified systems such as reachability analysis and model checking. Users can also
verify systems defined with temporal properties. CWB allows users to interactively simulate the
behavior of an agent. This is accomplished by guiding the agent through its state space in a
controlled fashion.
2.5.5 Process Meta Language
Promela differs from the languages discussed thus far in that it is a modeling language.
As such, it is used to abstractly model communication protocols (Holzmann, 1997). Promela is
perfectly suited for modeling agent conversations. Conversations are modeled as processes,
conversation paths are modeled as channels, and variables that may be used in a conversation can
be defined and tested. All statements are either executable or blocked, waiting to execute.
Statements may be blocked if the statement is a conditional statement and the condition is false.
In this case, the statement blocks until the condition becomes true. This property provides a
means of synchronizing communications between processes by causing one process (a responder)
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to wait on a message sent by another process (the initiator) while in a specific state.

The

initiating process may also block while waiting on a reply from the responding process.
Promela processes are defined with the word proctype. The following is an example of
a proctype declaration.
proctype ProcessAO
{

byte newVariable,newVariable = 3
}

The name of this process is Process A and curly braces encapsulate the body of the
declaration. Promela declarations can contain zero or many statements as well as local variable
declarations.

The proctype declaration above contains one local variable declaration,

newVariable, and a single statement: an assignment of the value 3 to the variable
newVariable. In Promela, semicolons and arrows '->' separate statements. Therefore, in the
above example no semicolon is needed after the last statement. The arrow is sometimes used as a
way to indicate a causal relation between two statements. For example:
byte newVariable = 2;
proctype ProcessAO
{
(newVariable ==1) -> newVariable = 3
}
proctype ProcessBO
{

newVariable = newVariable - 1
}

This example declares two processes, ProcessA and ProcessB. Since the variable
declaration newVariable is outside all processes, it is a global variable initialized to the value of
two.

ProcessA contains two statements and ProcessB contains a single statement that

decrements newVariable by one. An assignment is always executable, so ProcessB does not
block and executes immediately. However, if a condition is not true, then the process is blocked
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until the condition becomes true.

Therefore, ProcessA is blocked at the condition

(newVariable==l) until the value of newVariable is equal to one.
A proctype is only a process. It cannot run on its own. Something must start the
process running. Spin uses a process called init to start other processes running. The init
process is similar to a main procedure in Java programs. An init process declaration for the
previous example would look as follows:
init
{

run ProcessA();
run ProcessBO
}

In this example, the keyword run kicks off the two processes. Parameters can also be
passed

when

invoking

processes

with

the

run

statement.

For

example,

run

ProcessA (parameter!.).
2.5.6 Spin
Spin is an automated verification tool from Bell Labs that operates on the Promela
modeling language. It is designed to verify software instead of hardware and has been used to
verify many distributed systems and communication protocols (Holzmann, 1997). Spin will
detect deadlock, livelock, assertion violations, and many other communication centric errors.
Spin supports both synchronous and asynchronous communications by using channels to
pass messages and varying the channel buffer size. If the channel buffer size is zero, then the
communications are synchronous.

If the channel buffer size is greater than zero, the

communications are asynchronous.
With Spin, many types of simulations are possible. A user may choose to perform a
random simulation, or a guided simulation. A user may also choose to perform a verification that
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exhaustively searches the entire state space of the model for errors. If Spin finds an error, the
user can then perform a guided simulation that will reproduce the condition that caused the error.
This technique is very helpful for finding and pinpointing errors in models.
Spin can also catch correctness violations by checking for the existence of execution
sequences that abort because an assert statement has been violated. An assert statement
mandates that the asserted statement must remain true at all times.
To verify a system model is correct, Spin uses three specialized Promela states and
analyzes temporal formulas like those mentioned in previous sections. End states, progress
states, and accept states are used along with never claims to verify models. These features will
be covered in the next few sections.
2.5.6.1 End states
If a process does not complete its processing before the system terminates, Spin flags the
process as being in an invalid end-state. This is a common technique used to detect deadlock. If
a system designer designs a process so that it can stop without completing, then the process has to
be marked with an end label.
2.5.6.2 Progress states
Spin uses progress states to detect the presence of infinite overtaking by keeping track
of how often Spin executes a process labeled with a progress label. Spin will produce an error
if it cannot execute a progress labeled process an infinite number of times. In other words, any
process labeled with a progress label cannot remain blocked indefinitely from executing.
An example of the use of a progress label is:
proctype ProcessA(){
do
:: chanAtoBlp -> progress: chanAtoB?v
od}
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The presence of the progress label requires the statement chanAtoB?v be executed
infinitely many times. The only way this statement can be executed infinitely many times is if the
statement chanAtoB !p can also be executed infinitely many times.
2.5.6.3 Accept states
The accept state is treated exactly the opposite as the progress state and is used to
detect correctness of temporal property specifications. If Spin enters an accept state an infinite
number of times, an error is produced. A user can label a "trap" state with an accept label and
then Spin will check an infinite number of times if it can enter the trap state. If it can, then the
condition leading to the trap state has been met and Spin has succeeded in catching the error
condition.
The following process demonstrates the use of an accept state. This process should
eventually block at the beginning of the statement chanAtoBlp.

If this process did not

eventually block at this statement, then the process would run forever, and this would cause Spin
to produce an error. The accept state would be visited infinitely often because the process
would run forever, thus creating the error condition.
proctype ProcessAO
{ do
:: chanAtoBlp -> accept: chanAtoB?v
od
}

2.5.6.4 Never claims
Spin uses never claims to define temporal formulas. These never claims are then used
to check for undesirable or illegal state properties. Spin will produce an error if it finds any
execution sequence that ends where the never claim has terminated by reaching the closing
brace of its body. As detailed in an earlier section, Spin will produce an error if there is an
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execution sequence that visits infinitely often an accept state. Combining never claims and
accept states, Spin can detect illegal infinite (cyclic) behavior by labeling a block of statements
in a never claim with an accept label, creating an accept state, and then checking the selected
statements an infinite number of times to see if Spin can enter the blocked accept state.
2.5.6.5 Example claim
If p and q are two boolean variables and the temporal claim is made that "along every
computation, each system state in which p is true is eventually followed by the case when q is
true," then the following never claim verifies whether there are any violations of the temporal
claim.
never
{

do
:: p -> break
:: skip
od;
accept:
do
:: !q
od
}

The first do loop terminates only when the variable p becomes true. According to our
claim, the variable q should eventually become true. The second do loop (hence the never
claim) will never terminate and cannot be broken out of. The never claim continuously checks
the system state to see if q has become true. The never claim either eventually blocks because
the variable q becomes true (which is the desired behavior) and the accept state cannot be
entered, or Spin continuously enters the accept state because q is not true. If Spin can enter the
accept state without ever being blocked, this is an error. Because Spin guarantees an exhaustive
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search of the system state space, if there is any violation of our claim, Spin will detect it. If the
never claim ends in the accept state, then an error has been detected.
2.5.7 Summary
Each of the formal languages covered can accurately portray a system and describe the
system's behavior. The difference in the languages is the ease of use and understandability of the
language, as well as the automated tools that support the language. Promela is a modeling
language, and thus resembles a programming language rather than a formal language. This
feature makes Promela easier to understand for most computer scientists.
All three of the automated verification tools covered here can verify a system is deadlock
free. They can also verify safety properties and liveliness properties. The basic difference in the
systems lies in their input language. Therefore, the choice of which system to use depends
primarily on the choice of design language.
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///. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
Currently, the only way to formally verify the agent conversations designed in a multiagent environment with an automated tool is for someone to translate, by hand, the design into a
formal language and then run the verifier on this formal representation. Most people believe
formal methods are too difficult to understand and use in this manner (Hinchey, 1999). The
challenge then is to automatically generate the formal representation of a conversation from the
design in the multi-agent development environment. Then, using an automated tool, verify this
representation is free from undesirable communication properties such as deadlock.
As stated in Section 1.3, the goal of this research is to develop a formal methodology and
technique to verify that the communication protocols defined in a multi-agent environment are
valid. This chapter outlines steps that can be used to apply this research to any multi-agent
development environment. Section 3.2 explains how an agent conversation is modeled with a
state transition diagram. Section 3.3 explains how the state transition diagram can then be
converted into a set of state tables. The task of creating a formal representation of the state
transition diagram from the state table is described in Section 3.4. The process of verifying the
formal representation with an automated tool is detailed in Section 3.5. Figure 3 is a top-level
view of the overall process.
3.2 Modeling Agent Conversations with State Transition Diagrams
According to Roger Pressman,
The state transition diagram indicates how the system behaves as a
consequence of external events. To accomplish this, the state transition
diagram represents the various modes of behavior (called states) of the
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system and the manner in which transitions are made from state to state.
(Pressman, 1997)

Model Conversation
With A
State Transition Diagram

I

Convert State Transition
Diagram To A
State Table

I

Create Formal
Representation From
State Table

I

Verify Formal
Representation With An
Automated Tool
Figure 3: Top Level View of Methodology
An agent conversation consists of an initiator side and a responder side. Both sides of
the conversation move through various states by sending and receiving messages. Eventually,
both sides of the conversation should end up in their respective "end" states and the conversation
will be completed. It is the state transition diagram that allows us to visualize the various states a
conversation goes through and it records the events that cause the conversation to move from
state to state.
As shown in Chapter 2, Figure 4 illustrates one side of a conversation and Figure 5
illustrates the complimentary side of the conversation. The two sides make up one complete
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conversation, which may be part of a much larger system (or set) of conversations. The
conversation is shown here again for easy reference.
The responder side of the Sendlnfo conversation has four states and the transitions
complement the transitions in the initiator side of the conversation. The next step in the modeling
process is to convert the above state transition diagrams into a state table.
failure-transmission *send(information)
Sendlnfo: initiator

*send(information)

wait

"V
acknowledge

Figure 4: Initiator Half of Conversation Sendlnfo
Sendlnfo: responder
send( informat sn)

[invalide ata)^ailure»ransmission
send( information)
do: validate(information)

[validdataJN ^knowledge

m
Figure 5: Responder Half of Conversation Sendlnfo
3.3 Converting a State Transition Diagram to a State Table
A state table is a textual representation of a graphical state transition diagram. The
advantage a state table has over a state transition diagram is that it can be parsed easily. This
feature is critical when Promela source code has to be generated.
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The state table is built from the transition labels on the transition arrows of a state
transition diagram. The state table is simply an ordering of all the transitions possible in a state
transition diagram. The state table is ordered so all transitions pertaining to a particular state are
together. The state table also must begin with the Start state and end with the End state. Normal
state tables do not have these requirements, but they are necessary here for automatically building
Promela source code. The format of the state table should mirror that of the transition labels in a
state transition diagram. However, each entry in the state table needs to know the state the
transition is coming from and the state it is going to, even if it is the same state. One solution to
this problem is to add to the beginning of the state table entry the current state of the transition
while adding to the end of the entry the next state the transition will enter. The different fields of
the state table entry should be separated by a semicolon or some other character for ease in
parsing the table later. Figure 6 illustrates a state table using the Sendlnfo conversation in Figures
4 and 5. In this state table, a name is given to both halves of the conversation and this name
inserted at the beginning of each line. This naming convention will be used to create Promela
code later on.
SendlnfoResponder;startState;send;null;null;validationState
SendlnfoResponder;validationState;null;invalidData;
failureTransmission;waitstäte
SendlnfoResponder;validationState;nul1;validData; acknowledge;
endState
SendlnfoResponder;waitState;send;null;null;validationState
SendlnfoResponder;endState;null;nul1;null;null
Sendlnfolnitiator;startState;null;null;send;waitState
SendInfoInitiator;waitState;failureTransmission;null;send;waitState
Sendlnfolnitiator;waitState;acknowledge;null; null;endState
Sendlnfolnitiator;endState;null;null;null;null
Figure 6: State Table of Conversation Sendlnfo
Each line of the state table contains the following information: process name (consisting
of the conversation name and the participant's name), current state, received message, guard
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condition, transmitted message, and next state. Each entry in the state table must be unique to
prevent duplication of Promela code.
The state table provides a textual representation of the state transition diagram. The state
table is now used to build a formal representation of the state transition diagram by converting the
state table into Promela source code. The following section demonstrates how Promela is used to
model an agent's conversation.
3.4 Creating Promela Code from a State Table
Modeling a conversation with Promela is not as difficult as one would think. However,
creating the Promela code using as input a state table requires a method of parsing the state table
and automatically creating the source code. In this section, the Sendlnfo conversation is modeled.
Each Promela statement will be described as it is used.
3.4.1 Message Type Declarations
The first line of Promela code needed is the message type declarations. Promela has a
type called mtype that allows a programmer to declare constants without assigning values to the
constants. The declaration looks like this:
mtype={failureTransmission,send,invalidData,validData,acknowledge};
Promela does not allow hyphens in declarations, thus the word failureTransmission
instead of failure-transmission. These values are found by searching through the state
table and creating a vector of messages by examining the received message, guard condition, and
transmit message fields.
3.4.2 Channel Declarations
The next declaration required is the channel the messages will use. Promela allows for
synchronous or asynchronous transmissions. The channel declaration looks like this.
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chan busl = [1] of {mtype};
This declaration states that a variable busl is of the type chan, and it can hold one
message in its buffer. Only messages of type mtype can be sent on this channel. If the [ 1 ] was
replaced with [ 0 ], then no messages could be buffered and all messages would have to be taken
off the channel (received) before another message could be placed on the channel (transmitted).
The channel declarations are determined by the number of conversations in the state table. If
only one conversation is in the state table, then only one channel declaration must be made.
However, if for instance three conversations are contained in the state table, then three channels
must be used to prevent messages from interfering with each other.
3.4.3 Process Declarations (Proctypes)
The next step is to create processes that emulate each side of the conversation. Promela
has a construct called a proctype that models each half of a conversation.

Each process

contains all of the states for one side of the conversation. The processes are designed to begin in
the startstate and end in the endstate, while moving from states only if explicitly directed
to do so. Figure 7 shows the proctype declaration for the responder side of the Sendlnfo
conversation, while Figure 8 shows the initiator side of the same conversation.
The keyword proctype declares a procedure. The state labels all end with a colon. The
do. . od loops trap the flow of control inside their respective states. Two ways to exit a do. . od
loop is with a goto statement or a break statement. The goto transfers control to another state
while the break just exits the loop and falls through into the next state. For obvious reasons, it is
unacceptable to fall into another state unless explicitly directed to do so. An exclamation point
(!) after the channel variable busl signifies the message send has been placed on the channel.
The arrow (->) is a statement separator and serves as an implication symbol. If the statement
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before the arrow is executed then the statement after the arrow is also executed. The semicolon
(;) is also a statement separator but carries no implications. Finally, a question mark (?) after the
channel variable busl signifies the message following the question mark is taken off of the
channel via a receive action.
proctype SendlnfoResponder()
{
progressStartState:
do

:: busl?send -> goto progressvalidationState
od;
progressvalidationState:
do
:: invalidData->bus!failureTransmission;goto
progresswaitState
:: validData -> busl!acknowledge; goto progressendState
od;
progresswaitState:
do
:: busl?send -> goto progressvalidationState
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;
}
Figure 7: Process SendlnfoResponder
proctype Sendlnfolnitiator()
{
progressStartState:
do

:: busl!send -> goto progresswaitState
od;
progresswaitState:
do
:: busl?failureTransmission-> buslsend; goto
progresswaitState
:: busl?acknowledge -> goto progressendState
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;
}
Figure 8: Process Sendlnfolnitiator
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3.4.4 Process Declarations (Init)
Now that the processes representing the two halves of the conversation have been
modeled, a process needs to be created that will start the conversation processes running. This
process is called an init process. Figure 9 shows what the init process looks like for the
Sendlnfo conversation.
init
{ atomic
{
run SendlnfoResponder();
run Sendlnfolnitiator()
}
}
Figure 9: Init Process for Sendlnfo Conversation
The keyword atomic mandates all statements enclosed within its brackets will be
executed without interruption by external processes. The keyword run starts the processes
running and these processes are run in parallel. Figure 10 shows the complete Promela code for
the Sendlnfo conversation.
3.4.5 Verifying Message Sequences
Sequence diagrams (Rational, 1997) are beneficial for real-time specifications and for
complex scenarios. They show the explicit sequence of messages between agents and can exist in
a generic form (all the possible sequences of messages) or an instance form (one actual sequence
consistent with the generic form). Sequence diagrams show the big picture in the grand scheme
of agent conversations.
Listing desired messages between conversations in a specified order creates a message
sequence. Sequence diagrams represent interactions among agents within a system to achieve a
desired operation or result. A graphical representation of a message sequence is called a message
sequence chart (Rational, 1997). Figure 11 shows a valid message sequence chart encompassing
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two conversations (Sendlnfo and CollectData) between three agents (Commander, Mission Cntrl,
and Data Collection). Not all of the messages that could be sent in these conversations need be
included in the message sequence chart.
mtype = {failureTransmission, send, invalidData, validData,
acknowledge};
chan busl = [1] of {mtype};
proctype SendlnfoResponder()
{

progressStartState:
do
:: busl?send -> goto progressvalidationState
od;
progressvalidationState:
do
:: invalidData -> bus!failureTransmission; goto
progresswaitState
:: validData -> busl!acknowledge; goto progressEndState
od;
progresswaitState:
do
:: busl?send -> goto progressvalidationState
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;
}
proctype Sendlnfolnitiator()
{
progressStartState:
do
:: busl!send -> goto progresswaitState
od;
progresswaitState:
do
:: busl?failureTransmission -> buslsend; goto
progresswaitState
:: busl?acknowledge -> goto progressendState
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;}
init
{ atomic
{ run SendlnfoResponder();run Sendlnfolnitiator() }}

Figure 10: Complete Promela Code for Sendlnfo Conversation
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Commander

Data Collection

Mission Cntrl
send

coUectData
return
send

Figure 11: Message Sequence Chart
Message sequences are converted to a table similar to a state table as shown in Figure 12.
The format of the message sequence table is Conversation Name; Conversation From
Participant; Conversation To Participant; Message. When checking for a message sequence the
sequence is defined in a Promela never claim and checked for its existence. A never claim is a
special type of process that is optional and, if it exists, is used to detect undesirable behavior. If a
message sequence defined in a never claim is found, Spin will generate an error. Of course, this
is not really an error because we want to verify the sequence exists and the error condition has
confirmed the sequence does indeed exist.

Figure 13 is the never claim for the message

sequence table of Figure 12.
Sendlnfo;Responder;Initiator;send
CoUectData; Initiator ;Responder;collectData
CoUectData; Responder; Initiator; return
Sendlnfo;Initiator;Responder;send
Figure 12: Message Sequence Table
A key difference in the modeling of a message sequence and a conversation is the way
message events are detected. In a conversation, the channel that messages are transmitted on is
constantly monitored and messages must be placed on the channel and taken off the channel in a
predetermined order. In a message sequence, the channel is monitored but only desired messages
are detected.
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Many messages may be placed on the channel and taken off the channel before a desired
message is detected as part of a particular sequence. Modeling sequences in this fashion provides
great flexibility in detecting message sequences that span multiple conversations.
never
{
StateO:
do
:: Sendlnfo?[send] -> goto Statel
:: skip
od;
Statel:
do
:: CollectData?[collectData] -> goto State2
:: skip
od;
State2:
do
:: CollectData?[return] -> goto State3
:: skip
od;
State3:
do
:: SendRawIntel?[send] -> goto State4
:: skip
od;
State4:
do
:: Sendlnfo?[send] -> goto accept
:: skip
od;
accept:
skip
}

Figure 13: Never Claim for Message Sequence Verification
The completed Promela source code is now saved and will be used as input for the
verification tool Spin. The verification of the Sendlnfo conversation is covered in the next
section.
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3.5 Verifying a Communication Protocol Using Spin
There are three steps in running Spin: 1) Compile the source code, 2) Generate the
analyzer files, and 3) Execute the analyzer.
3.5.1 Compile the Source Code
Spin is invoked by passing it the file name of our Promela code. This command looks as
follows:
redir -o error spin -a verify
The redir -o error portion of the above command uses a utility provided by the C
compiler that will redirect the output of the spin command to a file called error. The -a
parameter generates a protocol specific analyzer. Spin's output is a set of C files, named pan
(protocol analyzer).
3.5.2 Generate the Analyzer Files
The second step in running Spin is to compile the pan files with a C compiler to produce
the analyzer (pan. exe), which is then executed to perform an analysis of the protocol. The
command required to compile the pan files is as follows:
gcc -DEBITSTATE -DSAFETY -o pan pan.c

The -o parameter guarantees an exhaustive state space search for errors.

The -

DEBITSTATE parameter uses a memory efficient bit state space method to prevent exhausting the
memory available on some machines.

The

-DSAFETY

parameter decreases the overhead

associated with liveness properties when only checking for safety properties. In this case, the
check is for deadlock, which is a safety property.
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If checking for non-progress states, a different command must be used. It is not possible
for Spin to check for both deadlocks and non-progress states at the same time. The command
needed is as follows:
gcc -DNP -DBITSTATE -o pan2 pan.c
In this command, the -DNP parameter directs Spin to check for non-progress cycles
instead of deadlocks.
There is one more command that can be used to analyze a conversation. If a never
claim is used in the model, then the -DSAFETY parameter cannot be invoked. This is because a
never claim can incorporate more than just safety properties. It is possible to check for a
message sequence with Promela/Spin using a never claim. Figure 13 is a message sequence
trace that contains the message sequence of Figure 11. The command that must be used when a
conversation is modeled this way is as follows:
gcc -DEBITSTATE -o pan pan.c
Notice that the command is just like the command to check for deadlocks, but without the
-DSAFETY

parameter.

3.5.3 Execute the Analyzer
The third step in running Spin is to execute the analyzer. The pan files are compiled into
an executable file called pan.exe.

The pan.exe file is the analyzer that when executed

analyzes the compiled protocol. The command to execute the analyzer is as follows:
redir -o output.txt pan.exe
This is the command to use when checking for deadlocks. When running the pan. exe
file, a trace file (verify. trail) is created if an error is found in the protocol. This trace file
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can then be examined by Spin to pinpoint the location of the error. The command to generate a
sequence trace based on the trail file is as follows:
redir -o trace.txt spin -t -c verify
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
q\p
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2

0 = :init:
1 = SendlnfoResponder
2 = Sendlnfolnitiator
3 = CollectDatalnitiator
4 = CollectBtaResponder
5 = CollectDatalnitiator
6 = CollectDataResponder
7 = SendRawIntelResponder
8 = SendRawIntellnitiator
9 = SendlnfoResponder
10 = Sendlnfolnitiator
0123456789

10
Sendlnfo!send
SendInfo?send
Sendlnfo! failureTransmission
SendInfo?failureTransmission
Sendlnfo!send
SendRawIntel!send
Sendlnfo?send
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
SendInfo?failureTransmission
SendRawIntel?send
.........
Sendlnfo!send
Sendlnfo?send
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
SendRawIntel!failureTransmission
SendInfo?failureTransmission
Sendlnfo!sfen
SendInfo?send
SendRawIntel?failureTransmission
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
Sendffm?failureTransmission
.........
.
Sendlnfo!send
SendInfo?send
Sendlnfo!acknowledge
Selldfo? acknowledge
SendRawIntel!send
SendRawIntel?send
SendRawIntel!failureTransmission
CollectDatalcollectData
SendRawIntel?failureTransmission
SendRawIntel!send
SendRawIntel?send
SendRawIntel!failureTransmission
CollectData?collectData
SendRawIntel?failureTransmission
SendRawIntel!send
SendRawIntel?send
ColelctData! col lectionFai lure
SendRawIntel!failureTransmission
SendRawIntel?failureTransmission
SendRawIntel! send
SendRawIntel?send
CollectData?collectionFailure
SendRawIntel[failureTransmission
SendRawIntel?failureTransmission
SendRawIntel!send

Figure 13: Message Trace of Message Sequence Verification
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The -t parameter directs Spin to follow the simulation trail in the tail file
(verify, trail). The -c parameter tells Spin to put the simulation output in columnated order.
If checking for non-progress errors, the command to execute the analyzer is as follows:
redir -o newpan2.txt pan2.exe -1
In this command, the -1 parameter tells the analyzer to find non-progress cycles. If
checking for a message sequence with a never claim that contains an accept state, then a different
command must be used. The command is as follows:
redir -o newpan.txt pan.exe -a
In this command, the -a parameter tells Spin to find acceptance cycles, which would
have been declared inside the never claim. Note that a never claim can be declared without an
acceptance state. However, Spin appears to find an error faster if an acceptance state is
used.
3.6 Interpreting Results
The only thing left to do is display the output. txt file for any error messages, and if
there were any errors, the trace. txt file for the detailed trace. The output will list any errors as
well as the quantity of errors. Figure 14 shows an example of the Spin output with no errors.
The messages generated by Spin show that a full statespace search was performed for
assertion violations and invalid end states. The search reached a depth of 12 levels and found
no errors. This conversation model contained three processes, and none of them had states that
were unreachable during the simulations.
If errors were detected during the verification process, text files are created that contain
the detailed error information. If a deadlock condition occurs, Spin generates an invalid end-state
error for each state that is deadlocked. If a state is never entered into, then Spin generates a non-
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progress state error message.

Finally, if a message sequence is not detected and an error

generated, then the message sequence does not exist and a true error is found. Figure 15 shows
the output generated by Spin when a deadlock condition is inserted into the Sendlnfo conversation
by changing one of the transmitted messages to a received message.
(Spin Version 3.2.4 — 10 January 1999)
+ Partial Order Reduction
Full statespace search for:
never-claim
- (none specified)
assertion violations
+
acceptance
cycles
- (not selected)
invalid endstates +
State-vector 28 byte, depth reached 12, errors: 0
12 states, stored
1 states, matched
13 transitions (= stored+matched)
1 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
(max size 2A18 states)
1.493
memory usage (Mbyte)
unreached in proctype SendlnfoResponder
(0 of 24 states)
unreached in proctype Sendlnfolnitiator
(0 of 18 states)
unreached in proctype :init:
(0 of 4 states)
Figure 14: Spin Output of Sendlnfo Conversation
In this output, only one error is detected. However, it was an invalid end-state caused by
a deadlocked state in the conversation. Spin generated a file called verify. trail that can be
used to recreate the message trace that caused the deadlock condition. This is very useful in
troubleshooting the condition that caused the error.
Figure 16 is the output generated by Spin when checking for non-progress states. Nonprogress states are detected if any state labeled with the keyword progress is not entered into.
This output did not detect any errors, but did note that two states in the procedure
SendlnfoResponder and two states in Sendlnfolnitiator were not reached. This error
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was caused because the conversation was deadlocked, and thus the conversation could not
proceed to these states and complete the conversation.
pan: invalid endstate (at depth 5)
pan: wrote verify.trail
(Spin Version 3.2.4 — 10 January 1999)
Warning: Search not completed
+ Partial Order Reduction
Full statespace search for:
never-claim
- (none specified)
assertion violations +
cycle checks
- (disabled by -DSAFETY)
invalid endstates +
State-vector 24 byte, depth reached 8, errors: 1
9 states, stored
1 states, matched
10 transitions (= stored+matched)
1 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
(max size 2A18 states)
1.493

memory usage (Mbyte)

Figure 15: Spin Output of Detected Deadlock
3.7 Summary
This chapter described the methodology used to verify agent conversations in a multiagent system. The process began by modeling the conversations using a state transition diagram.
The state transition diagram was then converted into a state table where it was parsed into the
Promela modeling language. Finally, Spin was run against the Promela code and deadlock and
non-progress errors where checked for. Also demonstrated was how Promela and Spin could be
used to verify message sequences by declaring a never claim and checking for the existence of
the desired message sequence.
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(Spin Version 3.2.4 -- 10 January 1999)
+ Partial Order Reduction
Bit statespace search for:
never-claim
+
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
non-progress cycles + (fairness disabled)
invalid endstates - (disabled by never-claim)
State-vector 32 byte, depth reached 16, errors: 0
10 states, stored
2 states, matched
12 transitions (= stored+matched)
2 atomic steps
hash factor: 381300 (expected coverage: >= 99.9% on avg.)
(max size 2A22 states)
3.066

memory usage (Mbyte)

unreached in proctype
line 21, state 21,
line 24, state 24,
(2 of 24 states)
unreached in proctype
line 38, state 15,
line 41, state 18,
(2 of 18 states)
unreached in proctype
(0 of 4 states)

SendlnfoResponder
"goto"
"-end-"
Sendlnfolnitiator
"goto"
"-end-"
:init:

Figure 16: Spin Output of Detected Non-progress State
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IV. Implementation
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 described how this research could be applied to a generic multi-agent
development environment.

This chapter outlines the steps taken to implement the generic

methodology in AFTT's agentTool multi-agent development environment. Section 4.2 provides
an overview of how multiple conversations are verified using agentTool. Section 4.3 steps
through three examples of how to verify multiple conversations. The first example will not
contain any errors. The second example will contain a deadlock condition and will contain nonprogress states (states that are not entered into). The third example will demonstrate how a
message sequence is verified. Finally, Section 4.4 gives an analysis of the types of errors that are
detected and reported by agentTool, and perhaps more importantly, those errors that are not
detected and reported.
4.2 Verification Overview
In agentTool, a conversation takes place between two agents. Therefore, the first step in
verifying a conversation is to create two agents and establish a conversation between them. After
the conversation is established, the two sides of the conversation must be defined. The agentTool
environment automatically creates a start state and an end state for each side of the
conversation. All the conversation designer must do is fill in the required states and transitions
for each side of the conversation.
The conversation definition process is repeated until all necessary conversations are
completed. The verification process is invoked by clicking on the Command pull down menu and
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choosing the Verify Conversations option. Figure 17 is a Data Flow Diagram (DFD) of the
entire verification process.
GriphkaJ
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Figure 17: Verification Data Flow Diagram
The next section provides details of each process listed in Figure 17.

After the

conversations have been verified, feedback is provided to the user by means of a text window that
contains useful and meaningful messages while highlighting states and transitions on the state
transition diagrams where errors have been detected. As often happens with source code and
compilers, a single error may generate many error indicators. For this reason, many states and
transitions may be highlighted when only one or two is actually in error.
4.3 System Design
The conversation verification subsystem of agentTool was implemented using Java, text
files, and batch commands. Each step of Figure 17 is detailed below to demonstrate how the step
was actually implemented.
4.3.1 Define Conversations
Conversations are designed in agentTool using state transition diagrams. The diagrams
are built using graphical tools. Conversation states and transitions between states have properties
associated with them that are defined by the system designer. This part of the agentTool research
effort is documented in Wood's Thesis (Wood, 2000).
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4.3.2 Build Conversation State Table
The state transition diagram must be converted into a state table before automatically
generating Promela source code. Wood's thesis addresses how the values for each state transition
are derived and a state table created. Each entry in the state table contains tiieconversation name,
the participant, the current state, the received message (if it exists), the guard condition (if it
exists), the transmitted message (if it exists), and the next state. Every transition in the state
transition diagram is mapped to an entry in the state table. The state table is actually a vector of
transitions that can be analyzed to build the Promela source code.
It is important the state table be ordered on conversation states so that all of a
conversation's information is contiguous (sequential without interruption). Therefore, once a
state table has been created it is sorted so all of a given state's transitions are together in the table.
4.3.3 Build Promela Code
Chapter 3 explains the general process of automatically building Promela source code
from a state table.

The process takes five steps: 1) declare mtype variables, 2) declare

channels, 3) build proctypes, 4) build init procedure, and 5) build never claim.
The Promela source code is saved in a text file. Before declarations can be made, the text
file must be created and opened. The name of the text file is simply Goverif y.
4.3.3.1 Declare mtype Variables
Received messages, guard conditions, and transmitted messages all must be declared as
mtype variables. To find these variables, the state table vector is searched one transition at a
time and appropriate variable names added to a new mtype vector. Every received message,
guard condition, and transmitted message is compared to the variables in the mtype vector. If the
variable already exists in the vector, it is passed over. However, if it does not exist in the vector,
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it is added. After one compete pass through the state table, the mtype vector contains a list of the
mtype variables with no duplicates.
The mtype declarations are the first entries in the Promela source code. The text string
mtype = { is printed along with the contents of the mtype vector delimited by commas. After
the mtype vector has been printed, the declaration is completed by printing}; and starting a new
line of the source code.
4.3.3.2 Declare Channels
Channels are the communication lines between two halves of a conversation. Therefore,
a channel exists for every conversation in the state table. The channel declarations are made by
first printing the text string chan.

Then the state table is searched sequentially and every

conversation name printed, comma delimited. The declaration is completed by printing = [1]
of {mtype}; and starting a new line of source code.
4.3.3.3 Build Proctypes
A proctype declaration must be made for each side of a conversation. The state table is
ordered so that all the transitions for a conversation's participant are together.

The first

transitions are those from the start state and the last entry for each participant in the state table is
the end state transition.
The state table vector is read sequentially and only one pass through the vector is
required to create all the proctypes. For each proctype declaration, the text proctype is
printed followed by the conversation name concatenated with the participant's name.

This

technique creates a unique proctype name for each side of every conversation. The initial line
of the declaration is finished with the text () and an opening brace printed on a new line. Each
state in the proctype is declared by printing the text progress followed by the state name and
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finished with a colon. The next line of the state declaration contains the textdo, which begins a
do loop. Every line of text within the do loop contains the text :: followed by the proper
formatting of the transition. After all the transitions for a given state are printed, thedo loop is
terminated by printing the text od;. After all the states have been printed, the proctype
declaration is completed by printing a closing brace. This process repeats until allproctypes
have been generated.
4.3.3.4 Build init Procedure
The init procedure is declared by printing the text init followed by an opening brace
on a new line. The key word atomic is then printed followed by another opening brace on a new
line. The state table is then read sequentially and a line printed for each conversation half (two
entries per conversation). Each line contains the keyword run followed by the conversation
name concatenated with the participant name and ended with parentheses. Each run statement
must be separated by a semicolon. After all the run statements are written, two closing braces,
each on its own line, must be printed.
The init procedure is the last part of the Promela source code that is created unless
checking for a valid message sequence. Then, in addition to the above procedures, a never
claim must be declared.
4.3.3.5 Build Never Claim
A never claim follows the init procedure. It is declared by first printing the keyword
never followed by an opening brace on a new line. The never claim is built by reading a
message sequence table. There must be a state in the never claim for each entry in the message
sequence table.

The states are declared by first labeling the state with the text State and

appending to it an integer beginning with 0 and incrementing the integer by 1 for every new state
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created. Each state label must end with a colon. Each state is made up of ado loop that contains
two entries.
The first entry is the channel name the message is expected to traverse appended with a
question mark to signify receiving a message on that channel. Appended to the channel name and
question mark is the message name enclosed in brackets. This method of detecting a message on
a channel allows unwanted messages to pass until the desired message is detected. An arrow is
appended to the bracketed message and a goto statement that directs the conversation to the
following state if the correct message is detected.
The second entry is a skip statement that keeps the never claim in the current state until
the desired message is detected. The state declaration is finished by ending the do loop with the
textod;.
After all the states have been printed, an accept state must be declared. The accept
state traps the never claim until all the conversations have terminated. The accept state is
created by printing the keyword accept: followed by the keyword skip on a separate line. The
never claim is then completed by printing a closing brace. The completed Promela source code
is now saved in the text file verify for use with Spin.
4.3.4 Check for Valid Conversations
When Spin is started, the Promela source code is first checked for syntactical errors.
Syntactical errors such as invalid characters in variable names will cause Spin to generate an error
file that contains the error messages. If after running Spin the error file contains messages, they
are displayed in the message window for the user to analyze. The command to run Spin against
the Promela source code created above is:
Spin.exe -a verify
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The -a parameter tells Spin to create an analyzer specific to the protocols specified in the
file verify. Syntactical errors must be corrected before the conversations can be verified. If no
error messages are reported, Spin creates the appropriate files that can be used to generate an
executable analyzer.
4.3.5 Check for Deadlock
Once the analyzer files have been created, an executable analyzer file must be created.
This is accomplished by compiling one of the newly generated files (pan. c) into an executable
file (pan. exe). The command required is:
gcc.exe -DEBITSTATE -DSAFETY -o pan pan.c

The gcc command invokes a standard C compiler. The -DEBITSTATE parameter uses a
memory efficient bit state space method to prevent exhausting the memory available on some
machines. The -DSAFETY parameter decreases the overhead associated with liveness properties
when only checking for safety properties. The -o parameter guarantees an exhaustive state space
search for errors.
Now pan. exe can be executed and the protocol specific files analyzed. The command
required for this is simply:
pan.exe
Spin displays the results of the analysis by default to the computer screen. However, the
output can be redirected to a text file by using a C utility, redir. The command to accomplish
this task is:
redir -o output.txt pan.exe

The -o parameter is used by the redir command and states the output should be
directed to the file output. txt.
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4.3.6 Check for Non-Progress
The check for non-progress is similar to that for deadlock. However, special parameters
must be used because Spin cannot check for both deadlock and non-progress with the same
command. The command required is:
gcc.exe -DNP -DEBITSTATE -o pan pan.c
In this command, the -DNP parameter directs Spin to check for non-progress cycles
instead of deadlocks. The newly created pan.exe must be executed to actually perform the
analysis, but the procedure is the same as in Section 4.3.5.
4.3.7 Check Valid Sequence
If checking for a valid message sequence, a slight modification to the deadlock check is
required. Since a never claim is declared when checking for valid message sequences, the check
cannot only be for safety properties. The check must now also include checking for liveness
properties associated with the never claim. The command required is:
gcc -DEBITSTATE -o pan pan.c
The command is exactly like the check for deadlocks except the -DSAFETY parameter is
missing and cannot be used. The newly created pan. exe file must be executed to analyze the
protocol specific files and generate the appropriate output.
4.3.8 Provide Feedback
Feedback is provided to the system designer through a text based message window and
through graphical highlighting of the state transition diagram. When executing thepan. exe file,
the output is redirected to a text file. The contents of the text file are then copied into the
message window enabling the system designer to see the results of the analysis. Sometimes the
Spin output is difficult to interpret for novice users, so the output is automatically parsed and
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states and transitions are highlighted to assist the user in locating errors. During the verification
process, a vector containing all known deadlock transitions and non-progress states is created and
used to highlight the state transition diagrams.
4.4 Examples
4.4.1 Conversation without Error
The first step in verifying conversations is to build the conversations. Figure 18 is an
image of agentTool showing a system with two agents and a conversation between them.
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Figure 18: Conversation between Agents
The only properties of the conversation a user can define from this screen is the name of
the conversation (Sendlnfo) and the direction of the conversation (who is the initiator and who is
the responder). By clicking on the conversation line, two tabs appear. One tab is to define the
state diagram for the initiator and one tab for the responder.
By clicking on one of the two tabs, a new window appears that automatically provides a
start and an end state for the conversation designer. It is assumed every conversation has a
start and an end state. In this window, designers add states and transitions to create a complete
state transition diagram. Figure 19 is an image of the initiator side of the Sendlnfo conversation.
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The complementary side of this state transition diagram is the responder side of the Sendlnfo
conversation and is shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 19: Initiator Side of Sendlnfo Conversation
The Sendlnfo conversation is now completely specified and is ready to be verified. The
verification process is invoked by clicking on the Command pull down menu and choosing
Verify Conversations. A state table is created from the states and transitions of the state
transition diagram and this state table is used to create the Promela Code. Figure 21 is the
Promela Code created from this conversation.
The automated tool Spin is now invoked to check the syntax of the Promela code. If the
code is syntactically correct, Spin generates an analyzer to determine if protocol errors exist in the
conversation. The first check is for deadlocks. Spin determines if deadlocks exist by seeing if
either side of the conversation terminates while not having reached its end state. Spin calls this
kind of error an invalid end-state error. If the conversation is deadlocked, a message is displayed
in a text window that tells the user exactly where the deadlock occurred. The offending state
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transition is also highlighted on the graphical state transition diagram. The highlighting can only
be removed by re-verifying the conversation.

Figure 20: Responder Side of Sendlnfo Conversation
After the deadlock check is performed, the conversation is checked for livelock by
checking for states that are never entered. Spin calls this type of error a non-progress error
because the conversation has not made progress in these particular states. Again, if an error
condition exists, a message is displayed in the text window telling the user exactly where the nonprogress states are and the non-progress states are highlighted on the state transition diagrams.
They remain highlighted until the conversation is re-verified. If a deadlock condition is detected,
a trace file is created by Spin that allows a simulation be run that pinpoints the location of the
error. This message trace is also displayed in the text window to help the user to find the source
of the conversation errors.

Figure 22 is the output messages displayed for the user when

verifying the Sendlnfo conversation.
Since there were no errors in this conversation, no error messages were displayed and no
states or transitions were highlighted. The next example will implement a conversation that has a
deadlock condition in it.
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mtype = {send, acknowledge, failureTransmission, invalidData,
validData };
chan Sendlnfo = [1] of {mtype};
proctype Sendlnfolnitiator()
{
progressStartState:
do
:: Sendlnfo!send -> goto progresswait
od;
progresswait:
do
:: SendInfo?acknowledge -> goto progressEndState
:: SendInfo?failureTransmission -> goto progressselfLoop
od;
progressselfLoop:
do
:: Sendlnfo!send -> goto progresswait
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;
}
proctype SendlnfoResponder()
{
progressStartState:
do
:: SendInfo?send -> goto progressvalidation
od;
progressvalidation:
do
:: invalidData -> Sendlnfo!failureTransmission; goto
progresswait
:: validData -> Sendlnfo!acknowledge; goto progressEndState
od;
progresswait:
do
:: SendInfo?send -> goto progressvalidation
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;}
init{
atomic
{
run Sendlnfolnitiator();
run SendlnfoResponder()
}
}
Figure 21: Promela Code of Sendlnfo Conversation
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!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!!
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis...
********** OUTPUT FROM DEADLOCK CHECK **********
CONVERSATION IS NOT DEADLOCKED!!!
********** OUTPUT FROM PROGRESS CHECK **********
CONVERSATION DOES NOT HAVE UNUSED STATES!!!
********** OUTPUT FROM SIMULATED RUN **********
No trace available

Figure 22: Output From Sendlnfo Verification Run
4.4.2 Conversation with Error
The conversations shown thus far are error free. However, agentTool provides excellent
user feedback when errors are detected. In order to demonstrate agentTool's error detecting and
reporting capability, a new conversation must be created between two agents. Figure 23 shows
the new conversation and agent added to the previous example.
ISTBTXJ
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Figure 23: Two Conversations with Three Agents
The CollectData conversation must now be described. As before, there is an initiator
side and a responder side to the conversation.

Figure 24 shows the initiator side of the

conversation while Figure 25 shows the responder side of the conversation.
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Figure 24: Initiator Side of CollectData Conversation
The initiator side of the CollectData conversation has an error in it. The transition from
the logFailure state that is labeled acknowledge is incorrect. As drawn, the transition is
waiting to receive an acknowledge message before transitioning to the end state. The transition
should be drawn so that it automatically sends an acknowledge message when in the wait state
and then immediately transitions to the end state. This incorrectly labeled transition will cause
the CollectData conversation to be deadlocked. Figure 26 is the Promela code for the collect data
conversation.

[Cony.ColttctData

\W

kamt Oxrm [tMKCtueBM* WBpNr

colKiO«a<Kfjut, tocatMi)
I

JcofcclkM
(celKHonConi|>M*r*i

cthctt«

?-^C
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\
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Figure 25: Responder Side of CollectData Conversation
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mtype - ( validData, invalidData, failureTransmission, acknowledgoollectData, return,
collectionFailure, sensorFailure, movanä'ailure, collectionComplete );
chan CollectData - [11 of (mtype);
proctype CollectDatalnitiator()
{
progressStartState:
do
:: CollectData!collectData> goto progresswaiting
od;
progresswaiting:
do
:: CollectData?return-> goto progressvalidateData
:: CollectData?collectionFailure> goto progresslogFailure
od;
progressvalidateData
do
:: invalidData-> CollectData!failureTransmission; goto progresswaiting
:: validData-> CollectData!acknowledge; goto progressEndState
od;
progresslogFailure:
do
: : CollectData?acknowledge> goto progressEndStaat
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;

>
proctype CollectDataResponder()

<
progressStartState:
do
:: CollectData?collectDato> goto progresscollecting
od;
progresscollecting:
do
sensorFalure -> CollectData!collectionFailure; goto progresswait
movementFailure-> CollectData!collectionFailure; goto progresswait
collectlonComplete-> CollectData!return; goto progresscollectionComplete
od;
progresscollectionComplete
do
:: CollectData?acknowledge> goto progressEndState
:: CollectData?failureTransmissioö goto progressselfLoop
od;
progresswait:
do
:: CollectData?acknowledge> goto progressEndState
od;
progressselfLop:
do
:: CollectData!retur»> goto progresscollectionComplete
od;
progressEndState:
do
:: break
od;

I
init
{
atomic

(

run CollectDatalnitiator()
run CollectDataResponder!)

)
)

Figure 26: Promela Source Code for CollectData Conversation
When the user verifies these two conversations, a message window appears that gives the
status of the verification. As soon as the error is detected, the color of the text in the window
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changes to red. Since a deadlock condition was detected, a trace file is created and the message
sequence trace is displayed in the message window.

Figure 27 shows the sequence trace

generated by the deadlock condition.
The two transitions that are deadlocked are also specified in the message window as well
as highlighted on the graphical state transition diagram.

Figure 28 shows the highlighted

transition for one side of the deadlocked conversation.
This method of feedback provides an excellent means for a user to identify problems in
conversations. Appendix A shows the entire contents of the message window after verifying
these two conversations.

Figure 29 shows the deadlock messages that are displayed in the

message window.
proc 0 = :init:
proc 1 = Sendlnfolnitiator
proc 2 = SendlnfoResponder
proc 3 = CollectDatalnitiator
proc 4 = CollectDataResponder
q\p
0
1
2
3
4
1
CollectDatalcollectData
1
.
.
.
.
CollectData?collectData
1
CollectDatalcollectionFailure
1
CollectData?collectionFailure
2
.
Sendlnfolsend
2
.
.
SendInfo?send
2
.
.
Sendlnfo!acknowledge
2
.
SendInfo?acknowledge
spin: trail ends after 16 steps
final state:
iprocesses: 5
16: proc 4 (CollectDataResponder) line 92 "verify" (state 27)
16: proc 3 (CollectDatalnitiator) line 65 "verify" (state 24)
16: proc
2 (SendlnfoResponder) line
46 "verify" (state 24)
<valid endstate>
16: proc
1 (Sendlnfolnitiator) line
25 "verify" (state 22)
<valid endstate>
16: proc
0
(:init:)
line 114 "verify"
(state 6) <valid
endstate>
5 processes created

Figure 27: Sequence Trace of CollectData Conversation
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Figure 28: Highlighted Transition from CollectData Conversation
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION:
Conversation Name = CollectData
Participant Name = Responder
Current State = wait
State Transition = acknowledge
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION:
Conversation Name = CollectData
Participant Name = Initiator
Current State = logFailure
State Transition = acknowledge

Figure 29: Deadlock Messages from Message Window
4.4.3 Message Sequence Verification
Once conversations are defined and verified, specific message sequences that traverse the
conversations can also be verified.

Currently agentTool does not have the capability to

graphically represent message sequence charts.

However, message sequence charts can be

represented via message sequence tables. Message sequence tables are very similar to state tables
except the state information is not required. All that is needed is theconversation the message is
a part of, the initiator and the responder of the message, and of course the message. Figure 30 is
a message sequence chart that can be verified using the above two conversations.
Figure 31 shows a message sequence table for the message sequence chart of Figure 30.
Before the message sequence can be verified, the conversations must be valid. Therefore, the
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CollectData conversation must be corrected by changing the received acknowledge message
from the logFailure state to a transmitted acknowledge message from thelogFailure state.
DitaCollection

MCEIement

Commander

Mnd(informaHon)
coIIectData(sensor,location)
rehirn(dita)

Figure 30: Message Sequence Chart for Sendlnfo and CollectData Conversations
SendInfo;Initiator;Responder;send
CollectData;Initiator;Responder;CollectData
CollectData;Responder;Initiator;return
Sendlnfo;Initiator;Responder;send

Figure 31: Message Sequence Table for Sendlnfo and CollectData Conversations
As described in Section 3.4.5, a message sequence is verified by making a never claim
that states the desired sequence can never occur. Spin then tries to detect the message sequence,
and if it finds the sequence a never claim violation is raised. This is a very efficient way to find
a message sequence using a state space analyzer. Appendix B shows the message window output
after searching for the message sequence in Figure 31. If the message sequence is valid, a trace
of the messages is provided to show how the sequence was found.
If the trace is not valid, Spin will not be able to find the never claim. Depending on the
machine's capabilities, verifying a message sequence does not exist may take quite a bit of time.
Figure 32 is a message sequence table that contains an invalid message sequence. The send
message in the CollectData conversation is invalid.
Sendlnfo;Initiator;Responder;send
CollectData;Initiator;Responder;send
CollectData,-Responder;Initiator;return
Sendlnfo;Initiator;Responder;send

Figure 32: Invalid Message Sequence Table
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The results of the invalid message sequence verification are displayed in the message
window and are referenced in Figure 33.
PLEASE STAND BY... TESTING MESSAGE SEQUENCE...
!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!!
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis...
********** OUTPUT FROM MESSAGE SEQUENCE CHECK **********
MESSAGE SEQUENCE IS INVALID!!!
********** SEQUENCE TRACE IS AS FOLLOWS **********
Message Sequence Invalid... - No trace available
********** TESTING COMPLETED **********

Figure 33: Invalid Message Sequence Output
Since the message sequence is invalid, no trace exists.
4.5 Analysis
Spin can check for many types of errors (Holzmann, 1997). However, agentTool does
not currently provide the capability to check for all of them. This section will discuss what can
and cannot currently be detected.
4.5.1 Errors Detected
4.5.1.1 Conversation Deadlocks
Conversation deadlocks are detected if there are no intervening factors such as hardware
failures or timing problems. This is accomplished by performing an exhaustive state space search
for deadlock conditions.
Figure 34 shows a conversation with a deadlocked condition. The transitions causing the
deadlock are highlighted. The transition on the initiator side of the conversation is incorrect in
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that it should be labeled as transmitting an acknowledge message instead of receiving an
acknowledge message.

Figure 34: Conversation with Deadlock Condition Detected
4.5.1.2 Unused States
Unused states are detected by checking for non-progress loops. If a state is not used, it is
not entered into and a non-progress error is generated.
Figure 35 shows a conversation with an unused state. The transition leading to the
unused state (State2) is never enabled. The transition is waiting for a received message (c) that
never is sent by the other side of the conversation. Therefore, the state can never be entered into
and is highlighted to assist the system designer.
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Figure 35: Conversation with Unused State Detected
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4.5.1.3 Unused Messages
Unused messages are detected when they are not taken off the message channel, thereby
leaving messages on the buffer. Since messages placed on the channel must be matched by a
receiving process that takes them off the buffer, any unused messages will generate deadlock
errors. This might not actually be a deadlock condition, but the error raised will generate enough
information for the user to identify the source of the problem.
Figure 36 shows a conversation with an unused message. The transition from State 1 has
a transmitted message (b) that is not received by the other half of the conversation, thus causing a
blockage.

«111

w>

f».
[I Brat*hJ^Iiptri

Figure 36: Conversation with Unused Message Detected
4.5.1.4 Mislabeled Transitions
Mislabeled transitions are detected when Spin is first run. If the syntax is incorrect, Spin
cannot compile the Promela code into the executable analyzer. Feedback is provided via a
message window when a syntax error occurs. Figure 37 shows the error messages generated
when an invalid character (?) is used in a transition.
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4.5.1.5 Inability to Create Required Sequences
Inability to create required sequences is detected using never claims. The desired
message sequence is modeled using a never claim, and if Spin does not generate a never claim
violation, the message sequence does not exist. Section 4.4.3 describes how an invalid message
sequence is detected and Figure 33 shows the messages after detecting the message sequence
does not exist.
spin: line
1
spin: line
9
spin: line 25
near 'goto'
spin: line 29
near 'goto'
spin: line 41

"verify", Error: syntax error saw 'operator: ?'
"verify", Error: syntax error saw 'operator: ?'
"verify", Error: undeclared variable: a saw

';'

"verify", Error: undeclared variable: b

*; '

saw

"verify", Error: proctype Convllnitiator not found

1 mtype = { ?a, a, b };
2
3 chan Convl = [0] of {mtype};
4
5 proctype Convllnitiator()
6 {

7 progressStartState:
8

do

9

: : ?a -> Convl!a; goto progressStatel

10

od;
Figure 37: Conversation Error Messages from Mislabeled Transition

4.5.2 Undetectable Errors
There are some communication errors that agentTool and Spin cannot currently detect.
These errors would be difficult for any automated system to detect; however, they are mentioned
here for completeness. There are plans to implement a syntax checker in agentTool that will
detect many of these errors such as state transition diagrams and guard conditions that are
incorrectly specified.
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4.5.2.1 Timing Errors
Timing errors caused by system properties cannot be detected by Spin.

The

conversations may be valid, but if a system property causes a conversation to pause indefinitely,
the complementary conversation is deadlocked until the system property allows the conversation
to continue. In this scenario, the conversations are valid and have been verified. Nevertheless,
the overall system will not perform correctly.
Figure 38 shows a conversation that is valid and verified. However, one of the transitions
(initiator side from start state) contains a guard condition that, if it never becomes true, will
prevent the conversation from completing.
[Swtom
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Figure 38: Timing Error Not Detected in Conversation
4.5.2.2 Floating States
Floating states (states with no transitions) cannot be detected by agentTool and Spin
because they are not passed from agentTool via a state table to the verifier. If a state does not
have any transitions, it is not included in the state table and it is non-existent as far as the verifier
is concerned. Figure 39 shows a state diagram created with agentTool that contains a floating
state. The conversation is valid and the floating state is ignored.
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4.5.2.3 Hardware Failures
Hardware failures that cause infinite conversation loops cannot be detected by agentTool
and Spin. The conversations are valid and have been verified, but if a sensor or other piece of
hardware continues to send the same message in the context of a valid conversation, the
conversation can become livelocked and the conversation cannot progress.

Figure 39: Floating State in Conversation
4.5.2.4 Guard Conditions
Guard conditions whose logic is specified incorrectly cannot be detected by agentTool
and Spin. If a guard condition is specified as part of a conversation, agentTool uses a figurative
representation of the guard condition to verify the conversation. If the guard condition consists of
an algebraic formula that is written incorrectly, Spin will never know.

Figure 40 shows a

conversation with a guard condition specified incorrectly. The logic is wrong (A>5 && A<5).
4.5.2.5 Interacting Conversations Deadlock
Interacting conversations deadlock that results when two conversations are contending
for a common resource cannot be detected by agentTool and Spin.

Even though the

conversations are valid, they can deadlock waiting for the same resource. Figure 41 shows a
conversation where both sides are waiting on the same file, but neither can have access to it.
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Figure 40: Incorrectly Specified Guard Condition in Conversation
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Figure 41: Interacting Conversations Deadlock
4.6 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated how agent conversations can be verified in agentTool
using Promela and Spin. The input is via graphical state transition diagrams while the feedback
to the user is both graphical and textual. Many critical communication centric errors are detected
by agentTool and Spin. However, not all errors are detected by the automated tool so the final
burden rests on the user to ensure the newly created multi-agent system is tested sufficiently.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters of this thesis demonstrated how the conversations in a multi-agent
system could be automatically verified.

This chapter summarizes the conclusions from the

previous chapters, and suggests areas of future work that will enhance and extend this research.
5.2 Conclusions
The previous chapters presented a methodology for automatically verifying multi-agent
conversations and a prototype implementing this methodology. The following sections present
conclusions obtained from this research.
5.2.1 Automatic Verification of Multi-agent Conversations
The automatic verification of conversations is a five step process that takes a graphical
representation of a conversation via a state transition diagram, converts the state transition
diagram to a state table, and creates a formal representation from the state table which can be
formally verified. Creation of the state transition diagrams and state tables are straightforward.
Creation of the formal representation requires in-depth knowledge of the formal language used.
Spin is an excellent modeling language because it is designed to represent communication
protocols. Other formal languages may be used, such as Communicating Sequential Processes or
Calculus of Communicating Systems, but these languages are very difficult to understand and
adapt to agent conversations.
This methodology is appropriate for verifying conversations in a closed agent system,
where agents communicate through known and predictable state-based conversations.

This

methodology can also verify message sequences exist given a set of conversations. Figure 42 is a
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state transition diagram used to graphically define an agent's conversation. Figure 43 is a
message sequence chart used to illustrate the possible sequence of messages involving potentially
many agent conversations.
The following is a summary of the types of errors detected through this methodology:
•

Conversation deadlocks are detected if there are no intervening factors such as
hardware failures or timing problems.

•

Unused states are detected by checking for non-progress loops.

•

Unused messages are detected when they are not taken off the message channel,
thereby leaving messages on the message buffer.

•

Mislabeled transitions are detected when Spin is first run by executing a syntax
checker provided by Spin.

•

The inability to create required sequences is detected using never claims.
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Figure 42: State Transition Diagram
A few errors cannot be detected at this time using this methodology. The following is a
brief list summarizing undetectable errors:
•

Timing errors caused by system properties will cause valid conversations to
hang-up.
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•

Floating states (states with no transitions) cannot be detected because they are not
passed from the graphical interface to the verifier.

•

Hardware failures that cause infinite loops cannot be detected.

•

Guard conditions incorrectly specified cannot be detected because the verifier
does not evaluate guard conditions.

•

Interacting conversations deadlock that results when two conversations are
contending for a common resource cannot be detected.
DataCollection

MCElement

Commander

sen d(in formation)
co llectDa ta(senso r,loci tio n)

return(data)

Figure 43: Message Sequence Chart
5.2.2 Implementation with agentTool
With agentTool, agent conversations are modeled using state transition diagrams. These
state transition diagrams are automatically converted into Promela source code and verified with
Spin.

Feedback is provided to the system designer through text windows and graphical

highlighting of error conditions in the original state transition diagrams. Although agentTool is
still in development, it is a valuable tool for assisting the multi-agent system developer in
building complex systems.
5.3 Future Work
AgentTool verification can be made more complete by adding a syntax checker to catch
typographical and logical errors before attempting to verify conversations. Since agents designed
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with agentTool are state-based, their designs should also be able to be verified using Promela and
Spin.
5.3.1 Development of a Syntax Checker
Programming language compilers such as C and JAVA contain a syntax checker to
ensure the programs written in their language are specified correctly. The syntax of agent and
conversation specifications made with agentTool should also be evaluated by a checker to ensure
they are written correctly. A syntax checker for agentTool would ensure 1) invalid characters
(such as !?@#) are not used in conversation specifications, 2) guard conditions are logically
correct, and 3) "do" actions required in conversation states or transitions are implemented in the
agent's behavior. A syntax checker would also perform such tasks as ensuring at least one
message (transmit, receive, or both) is associated with a transition.
The Object Constraint Language (OCL), developed by Integrated Business Engineering
Language, IBM, is part of the Unified Modeling Language from version 1.1 on (Rational, 1997).
OCL is based on standard set theory and is used to specify invariants on classes and types in the
class model, to describe pre- and post conditions on operations and methods, and to describe
guards. OCL can be used to write expressions that evaluate to true or false, thus making it a
good choice for defining relational algebra formulas.
IBM has written a parser for OCL that can perform some basic syntax checking. This
parser may be incorporated into the agentTool architecture and used to verify specifications
written in OCL are correct. Portions of agent and conversation specifications in agentTool are
written in OCL and should be verifiable with an OCL parser.
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5.3.2 Verification of an Agent's State-based Behavior
Since an agent's behavior can be defined using state transition diagrams (Robinson,
2000), a system of agents can be verified by simulating the response agents have when receiving
and sending messages through conversations with other agents. Figure 44 shows an agent's state
based interior.

Figure 44: Agent State Based Interior (Robinson, 2000)
This would be similar to the research performed in this thesis and many of the same techniques
reapplied.
5.4 Summary
This research addresses a critical need in the development of multi-agent systems,
automatic verification. Automatic verification brings together the skills of computer scientists
and mathematicians resulting in software that is more dependable and robust than previously
attainable with traditional software development tools. Software engineers no longer have to
hope their agent conversations will work as expected. Automatic verification, once thought
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impossible to accomplish, is attainable and provides a much-needed tool for multi-agent
development systems.
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APPENDIX A: MESSAGES FOR ERROR
CONVERSATION
PLEASE STAND BY... TESTING CONVERSATIONS...
!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!!
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis...
********** OUTPUT FROM DEADLOCK CHECK **********
CONVERSATION IS DEADLOCKED!!!

*******►,**

OUTPUT FROM PROGRESS CHECK **********

CONVERSATION DOES NOT HAVE UNUSED STATES!!!
**** OUTPUT FROM SIMULATED RUN **********

****** i

proc 0 = :init:
proc 1 = Sendlnfolnitiator
proc 2 = SendlnfoResponder
proc 3 = CollectDatalnitiator
proc 4 = CollectDataResponder
q\p
0
12
3
4
1
CollectData!collectData
1
CollectData?collectData
1
CollectDataicollectionFailure
1
CollectData?collectionFailure
2
.
Sendlnfoisend
2
.
.
SendInfo?send
2
.
.
Sendlnfo!acknowledge
2
.
Sendlnfo?acknowledge
spin: trail ends after 16 steps
final state:
#processes: 5
queue 2 (Sendlnfo):
queue 1 (CollectData) :
proc 4 (CollectDataResponder) line 92 "verify" (state 27)
16
proc 3 (CollectDatalnitiator) line 65 "verify" (state 24)
16
proc
2 (SendlnfoResponder) line
46 "verify" (state 24) <valid
16
endstate>
proc
1 (Sendlnfolnitiator) line
25 "verify" (state 22) <valid
16:
endstate>
proc 0 (:init:) line 114 "verify" (state 6) <valid endstate>
16:
5 processes created
********** DETAILED DEADLOCK INFORMATION **********
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION:
Conversation Name = CollectData
Participant Name = Responder
Current State = wait
State Transition = acknowledge
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION:
Conversation Name = CollectData
Participant Name = Initiator
Current State = logFailure
State Transition = acknowledge
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********** TESTING COMPLETED * *********

Appendix B: Messages from Message Sequence
Verification
PLEASE STAND BY... TESTING MESSAGE SEQUENCE...
!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!!
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis...
********** OUTPUT FROM MESSAGE SEQUENCE CHECK **********
MESSAGE SEQUENCE IS VALID!!!
********** SEQUENCE TRACE IS AS FOLLOWS **********
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
q\p
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

= :init:
= Sendlnfolnitiator
= SendlnfoResponder
= CollectDatalnitiator
= CollectDataResponder
= CollectDataResponder
=» CollectDatalnitiator
= Sendlnfolnitiator
= SendlnfoResponder
012345678
Sendlnfo!send
SendInfo?send
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
SendInfo?failureTransmission
Sendlnfo!send
CollectData!collectData
SendInfo?send
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
Sendlnfo?failureTransmission
Sendlnfo!send
CollectData?collectData
SendInfo?send
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
SendInfo?failureTransmission
CollectDataIcollectionFailure
Sendlnfo!send
SendInfo?send
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
CollectData?collectionFailure
SendInfo?failureTransmission
Sendlnfo!send
SendInfo?send
CollectData!collectData
Sendlnfo!failureTransmission
Sendlnfo?failureTransmission
Sendlnfo!send
SendInfo?send
CollectData?collectData
CollectData!return
CollectData?return
CollectData!failureTransmission
CollectData?failureTransmission
CollectData!return
Sendlnfo!send
CollectData?return
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spin: trail ends after 98 steps
final state:
♦processes: 10
queue 1 (Sendlnfo): [send]
queue 2 (CollectData):
proc 8 (SendlnfoResponder) line 15 "verify" (state 10)
98
proc 7 (Sendlnfolnitiator) line 34 "verify" (state 11)
98
proc 6 (CollectDatalnitiator) line 56 "verify" (state 15)
98
proc 5 (CollectDataResponder) line 88 "verify" (state 28)
98
proc 4 (CollectDataResponder) line 83 "verify" (state 23)
98
proc 3 (CollectDatalnitiator) line 60 "verify" (state 24)
98
9 "verify" (state 3)
proc 2 (SendlnfoResponder) line
98
proc 1 (Sendlnfolnitiator) line 34 "verify" (state 11)
98
proc 0 (:init:) line 110 "verify" ( state 10) <valid endstate>
98
proc - (:never:) line 136 "verify" (state 26) <valid endstate>
98
CI
10 iprocesses created
********** TESTING COMPLETED

**********
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